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The concept of power has long played a significant role in political 
thought, and recent decades have witnessed many attempts to analyze 
power and provide criteria for its measurement. 1 In spite of this impres- 
sive literature, however, our understanding of  power remains inadequate. 
Specifically, no fully comprehensive conceptual framework exists within 
which questions about power can be formulated precisely and dealt with 
systematically. In the absence of  such a framework it is difficult to inves- 
tigate empirical questions, such as the extent to which a country is dom- 
inated by a 'power elite,' and it is hard to discuss normative issues, such 
as the relationship between power and freedom, or the relationship 
between equality of power and justice. 
In this paper I shall outline a theory of  power the ultimate aim of  which 
is to "shed light on empirical and normative questions in the political do- 
main. To achieve this aim, however, it is wise to broaden our perspective. 
The domain of  power is not confined to the political realm, narrowly con- 
ceived: employers have power over employees and teachers over students. 
Nor  is power purely an inter-personal matter: men have power over na- 
ture as well as over other men. Although I am primarily interested in so- 
cial and political power, I shall construe the notion of  power broadly 
enough to cover all of  these areas. There is an even wider sense of 'power' 
with which I shall not be concerned, the sense in which we speak of  the 
power of  an engine or a machine. I shall confine my attention to the sense 
in which a man or a group of men are said to have power. In this endeavor 
I shall be in the spirit of  Hobbes, who wrote: "The power of  a man, to 
take it universally, is his present means to obtain some future apparent 
good." 
A theory of  power must enable us to account for the fact that Nelson 
Rockefeller is, on the whole, an extremely powerful person. This does not 
imply that he has power over every man or every issue. There are many 
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issues over which Rockefeller lacks power completely, e.g., what grade a 
student receives in my course. Nevertheless, a person's total power is 
dearly related to his power over particular issues. Thus, in the first sec- 
tion of the paper, I shall explain what it is for an individual to have power 
with respect to a given issue, for example, who obtains a certain appoint- 
ment, or whether it rains on Wednesday. Social theory does not restrict 
its interest to the power of individuals, however; of equal significance is 
the power of groups. In the second section, therefore, I shall turn to the 
nature of collective power. An analysis of collective power is needed to 
appraise the power of a nation, of the Pentagon, or of groups such as 
automobile manufacturers and ethnic minorities. Moreover, to the extent 
that a person's power is a function of his membership in groups that have 
collective power, an understanding of collective power is necessary to 
complete our account of the power of an individual. The first two sections 
of the paper primarily concern the conditions in which a person or group 
has at least some power on a given issue. A full-fledged theory, however, 
must enable us to make comparisons of power. While the Secretary of 
Defense has considerable power over military policy, the President has 
even more power. In the third and fourth sections, then, I shall address 
myself to the problem of comparisons of power and degrees of power. 
Finally, in the fifth section, I shall discuss the nature of power over a 
person (as opposed to an issue) and to the nature ofoverallpower. 
Throughout the paper I shall of course try to capture common-sense 
intuitions and judgments about power (ones that would be shared by 
people of different political persuasions). My primary concern, however, 
is not to canvass every use of 'power' in everyday speech, but rather to 
embark on the construction of a theory. Perhaps it is an inevitable feature 
of philosophical theorizing that certain intuitions and usages are empha- 
sized while others receive merely passing attention. But the benefits of 
theory construction can make this price well worth paying. 
I. I N D I V I D U A L  P O W E R  
The central idea in the concept of power, I suggest, is connected with 
getting what one wants. An all-powerful being is a being whose every de- 
sire becomes reality. An all-powerful dictator is one whose every desire 
for state policy becomes the policy of the state. One man X has another 
I 
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man Y 'in his power' if  what happens to Yis a function of what X wants 
to happen to him. The centralnotion, in all of  these cases, is that a power- 
ful man is a man whose desires are actualized, i.e., a man who gets what 
he wants. 
It would be wrong to conclude that whenever one gets what he wants 
one must have power in the matter. A farmer may want rain on a particular 
occasion and may happen to get what he wants, but it does not follow that 
he has power or control over the weather. Even a person who regularly 
gets what he wants need not be powerful. The Stoics, and Spinoza as well, 
recommended that one form one's desires to accord with what can realis- 
tically be expected to happen in any case; they regarded freedom as con- 
formity of  events with actual desires, or rather, as conformity of  desires 
with events. But as an account of  power this is inadequate. To take an 
extreme example, consider Robert Dahl's case of the 'chameleon' legis- 
lator who always correctly predicts beforehand what the legislature is 
going to decide, and then forms a desire or preference to accord with this 
outcome. 2 The chameleon always gets what he wants, but he is not one of  
the more powerful members of  the assembly. 
What these cases show - and what is probably clear from the outset - 
is that an analysis of  power cannot simply concern itself with what an 
agent actually wants and actually gets, but must concern itself with what 
he wouldget on the assumption of  various hypothetical desires. To say that 
S is powerful is not to say that he usually gets what he in fact wants, but 
that whatever he wanted he would get, no matter what he might happen 
to want. To explicate the concept of  power, we must appeal therefore to 
subjunctive conditionals. Although we shall later discuss what it is for a 
person to be powerful in general, we begin by asking what it is for a per- 
son to have power over, or with respect to, a single issue or event. The 
following notation will be used. 'E '  stands for an issue, e.g., whether or 
not it rains at a particular time and place; 'e' and 'not-e' stand for pos- 
sible outcomes of that issue, e.g., the occurrence of rain and the non- 
occurrence of  rain, respectively. To assess the claim that person S has 
power with respect to (henceforth to be written: 'w.r.t.') an issue E, let us 
ask what would happen (a) if S wanted e to occur, (b) if S wanted not-e 
to occur, and (c) if S were neutral between e and not-e. I f  E is the issue of  
whether or not it rains (at a particular time and place), we would consider 
whether or not it would rain (a) if S wanted rain, (b) if S wanted non- 
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rain, and (c) if S were neutral between rain and non-rain. For  any issue 
E, there are eight (logically) possible situations S might be in w.r.t. E, 
each represented by a function that  maps attitudes of  S vis-~t-vis E onto 
outcomes of  E. These eight situations are shown in the table below, in 
which the following notation is used: 'N(S ,  e)' stands for 'S  is neutral 
between e and not-e, '  'W(S,  e)' stands for 'S  wants e', and 'W(S,  -e)' 
stands for 'S  wants not-e'. The if-thens are subjunctive conditionals. 
Situation (4), for example, is a situation in which outcome e would occur 
if  S were neutral on the issue, or if  S wanted e to occur, but outcome not-e 
would occur i f S  wanted not-e to occur. 
If N(S, e) then If W(S, e) then If W(S, -- e) then 
(1) e e e 
(2) e - e  e 
(3) e - e - e 
(4) e e --e 
(5) - e  --e - e  
(6) - e -- e e 
(7) - e  e e 
(8) --e e --e 
In two of these possible cases, viz. (1) and (5), S is impotent w.r.t, the 
issue. In (1) it would rain no matter  how S might feel about  it. In other 
words, S's attitude would make no difference to the outcome, though if 
he happens to have the 'right '  desire, he will get what he wants. In cases 
(2) and (6) S is even worse off than impotent;  he is 'counter-potent'. In 
these possible cases it would rain if  S wanted non-rain and it would not 
rain if  S wanted rain. Cases (3) and (7) are rather anomalous, and I have 
no name for them. But, like the four previous cases, they are not o n ~  in 
which S has power w.r.t, the rain. Turning finally to (4) and (8), we find 
cases in which S does have power w.r.t, the rain. In these cases S would 
get his way on the issue no matter  which outcome he might prefer. A desire 
for rain would lead to rain and a desire for non-rain would lead to non- 
rain. The difference between (4) and (8) is that in the former, rain would 
occur if S were neutral on the issue, whereas in the latter, non-rain would 
occur if  S were neutral. In both  cases, however, a desire by S for either 
outcome would lead to the occurrence of that  outcome. 
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The following analysis of power is suggested by the foregoing. 
S haspower w.r.t, issue E if  and only if  
(I) (1) l f  S wanted outcome e, then e would occur, and 
(2) l f  S wanted outcome not-e, then not-e would occur. 
This analysis, I believe, is very much on the right track. But the following 
difficulty presents itself. Suppose that S is totally paralyzed and incapable 
of action. Another person, S*, has the ability to control the weather; but 
S does not know of S*'s existence, and even if he did, he would have no 
idea how to communicate with him. Unbeknownst to S, however, S* can 
detect S's desires by ESP (or by appropriate gadgetry attached to his 
central nervous system), and S* has freely decided to make the weather 
conform with whatever desire S has vis-~t-vis the weather. In this case S 
satisfies (I) w.r.t, the weather, but it is doubtful that we would credit S 
with power w.r.t, the weather. Although S would get what he wants 
vis-~t-vis the weather, this is not because of anything he would do. 
A refinement in our analysis seems to be called for, a refinement that 
incorporates the element of action. To formulate this refinement, let us 
introduce the notion of a basic act-type. There are certain types of acts, 
e.g., raising one's hand, taking a step, and uttering certain sounds, which 
have the following properties: (a) in ordinary circumstances, if a person 
wanted to perform such an act, he would perform it, and (b) his ability to 
perform it is independent of knowledge or information concerning other 
acts that would have to be performed in order to perform it. 3 In short, a 
basic act-type is one that a person can do 'at will', an act-type that is 
'directly' under his control. Now frequently, in order to achieve a desired 
outcome, a person has to perform an appropriate sequence of basic acts, 
and these acts have to be performed at appropriate times. It is necessary, 
therefore, to attend to temporal matters. First, the issue in question must 
be dearly specified by indicating its time (i.e., the time of its outcomes). 
Who will be elected mayor in 1972 is a different issue from who will be 
elected mayor in 1974; S may have power w.r.t, one of these issues but 
not the other. Similarly, whether or not it will rain in Ann Arbor on 
Tuesday is a different issue from whether or not it will rain in Ann Arbor 
on Wednesday; S's having power w.r.t, one of these issues does not ensure 
his having power w.r.t, the other. We shall be concerned, then, with the 
issues that have 'built in' times. 4 This will be indicated by placing the 
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temporal reference in parentheses. Secondly, we need to specify the time 
at which a person has power w.r.t, an issue. If, at t,, there are sequences 
of acts available to S that would lead to each of the outcomes of E (at t a o), 
then S may have power, at tj, w.r.t. E (at t,o). But if S fails to act appro- 
priately between t~ and t5, he may no longer have power, at ts, w.r.t. 
E (at tlo). With these points in mind, we may propose the following anal- 
ysis of (individual) power. 
S has power, at t 1, w.r.t, issue E (at t,) i f  and only i f  
(I') (1) There is a sequence o f  basic act-types such that 
(a) i f  S wanted e, then he wouldperform these acts 
at appropriate times between t 1 and t,, and 
(b) i f  S performed these acts at these appropriate 
times, then e wouM oceur (at t.) ; 
(2) There is a sequence of  basic act-types such that 
(a) i f  S wanted not-e, then he would perform these acts 
at appropriate times between t a and t,,, and 
(b) i f  S performed these acts at these appropriate 
times, then not-e would occur (at t,).5 
Let us see how (I') would apply to the rain example. The issue here is 
whether or not rain occurs (at t.). Let us assume that the state of the world 
(in particular, the meteorological conditions) at t~ is such that it is going 
to rain at t, unless S does certain things between tl and t,. (I assume that 
the occurrence or nonoccurrence of rain is determined by antecedent 
events, including the acts of S. Determinism will be assumed throughout 
the paper.) In order to prevent rain, S must disperse the clouds, or evap- 
orate them, and this must be done before t,. Now there are two possible 
cases to consider. 
Case 1 : S is an ordinary fellow who has no way to disperse or evaporate 
the clouds; in other words, no basic acts of his would lead to the disper- 
sion or evaporation of the clouds prior to t,. In this case, S does not 
satisfy (I'). Of course S trivially satisfies the first conjunct of (I'), assum- 
ing, at any rate, that he can perform some basic acts. For no matter what 
sequence of basic acts he performs between ta and t,, it will rain at t, 
(the rain will not be caused by any of his acts, however). But S does not 
satisfy the second conjunct of (I'), for, ex hypothesi, no basic acts S could 
perform would lead to non-rain at t,. Case 2: S possesses a chemical that 
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evaporates rain clouds, and S has an airplane at his disposal that would 
enable him to spray the chemical onto the clouds (before tn). Moreover, 
S knows that the chemical would evaporate the clouds, know how to fly 
the plane, and has other requisite pieces of information. In this case, S 
satisfies the second conjunct of (I') in addition to the first conjuct. There 
is a sequence of basic acts - viz., acts by which S would place the chemical 
into the plane, acts by which he would fly the plane into the atmosphere, 
and acts by which he would spray the chemical onto the clouds - such 
that (a) if S wanted non-rain he would perform this sequence of acts (at 
appropriate times), and (b) if S performed them, non-rain would occur 
(at tn). 
It must be stressed that the conditionals in (I') are subjunctive condi- 
tionals, not causal subjunctive conditionals. If they were construed as 
causal conditionals, then even in Case 2 S could not be credited with 
power w.r.t.E. This is because there is no sequence of basic acts S can 
perform that would cause the occurrence of rain at tn (although there are 
many sequences of basic acts he can perform such that, if he performed 
them, rain would occur at tn). 
It might be argued that the use of causal subjunctives could simplify 
our analysis; instead of requiting that S be able to obtain both outcomes 
o f  E, we could merely require that S be able to cause (at least) one outcome 
of E. (As long as ordinary subjunctives are employed rather than causal 
subjunctives, the requirement that two outcomes be achievable must be 
retained; otherwise S would qualify for having power w.r.t, the rain even 
in Case 1. Using causal conditionals, however, it might be sufficient to 
require that S be able to cause one outcome.) Although reliance on causal 
conditionals probably would simplify the analysis, I believe it would also 
prove less illuminating. By relying on ordinary subjunctives only, we shall 
be forced to take a careful look at problems which might be neglected if 
we allowed ourselves the luxury of the causal idiom. Causal terminology 
is especially unhelpful in dealing with the kinds of cases of paramount 
interest to a theory of power, i.e., cases in which an outcome is a function 
of the actions of numerous agents. In thinking about distributions of 
power and degrees of power among many persons and many groups, the 
use of causal terminology is likely to obscure the crucial questions rather 
than illuminate them. It seems advisable, therefore, to avoid all reliance 
on the concept of causation from the outset. 
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A different possible objection to our analysis of power is that it seems 
to neglect the most important ingredients of power. In most of the litera- 
ture on power, such things as wealth, authority, status and similar 're- 
sources' play a crucial role; but they make no appearance whatever in 
(I'). Is this not a devastating omission? Now although such resources are 
not explicitly mentioned in our analysis, it should be clear that the satis- 
faction of  (I') in any particular case depends on precisely such factors. 
Our analysis makes no reference to the existence of certain chemicals, or 
the availability of an airplane, but it is just such things that make it true 
that S has power w.r.t, the rain (at tn). Similarly, although our analysans 
makes no explicit reference to institutional hierarchies or to positions of 
influence, it is just these sorts of things that determine whether a person 
has power w.r.t, the granting of  a government contract. I f  S has control 
over a defense contract, this is not simply because he has a certain basic 
act repertoire; it must be because he occupies a position of authority in the 
governmental structure, or perhaps because he is in a position to influence 
officials through credible threats or offers. That  these are the sorts of 
resources that give rise to power, however, does not imply that they ought 
to be mentioned explicitly in the analysis of power. Indeed, it would be 
foolish to try to construct an analysis that itemizes relevant resources. 
For  even a single issue, the number and variety of  potentially relevant 
resources is endless; and it is surely wholly impossible to say what re- 
sources are necessary and sufficient for issues in general What is impor- 
tant, then, is that an analysans imply the existence of an appropriate set 
of resources, without necessarily characterizing these resources 'in- 
trinsically'. This is what we accomplish in our analysans by the use of  
subjunctive conditionals. 
Our analysis of power may be compared to a conditional analysis of 
disposition terms like 'soluble' or 'fragile'. In analyzing 'X is soluble in 
water' as ' I f  X were immersed in water, it would dissolve', we say nothing 
specific about the internal structure of X, the structure in virtue of which 
it is true that X would dissolve if immersed in water. Nevertheless, there 
must be some actual structure which makes this conditional true. More- 
over, we may construe the hypothetical statement 'If  X were immersed in 
water, it would dissolve' as asserting the existence of such a structure, n 
That  is, we may construe it as asserting: 'The structure of  X (and the 
structure of  water) is such that if X were immersed in water, it would 
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dissolve'. The case of  power is quite analogous. In saying that outcome e 
would occur if S were to perform certain acts, we do not indicate which 
facts about the world, which resources possessed by S, make this condi- 
tional true. Nevertheless, there must be some such facts or resources. 
Indeed, we may construe our subjunctive conditionals as asserting their 
existence. That  is, we may construe the force of  (1) (b) as follows: 'The 
state of S's resources (or the state of  the world) is such that if S performed 
the indicated sequence of basic acts at appropriate times, then outcome e 
would occur (at tn)'. We may say, therefore, that resources such as wealth, 
authority, reputation, attractiveness, friendship and physical location play 
the same sort of role vis4t-vis power as molecular structure plays vis-h- 
vis solubility. It is the possession of such resources that confers power, 
or, if you like, that is power, 
The preceding remarks give us insight into the kinds of conditions that 
must obtain in order that certain outcomes would occur if S performed 
certain sequences of  basic acts. In other words, we gain some insight into 
the conditions underlying clauses (I) (b) and (2) (b) of  (I'). But what of  
(I) (a) and (2) (a)? What conditions must hold in order that S would select 
an appropriate sequence of basic acts if he wanted outcome e and in order 
that S would select an appropriate sequence of basic acts if he wanted 
outcome not-e? The answer is: S must have appropriate items of  knowl- 
edge or belief. In order that S select appropriate sequences of basic acts 
- i.e., sequences that would really lead to the desired outcome - it is not 
sufficient that S simply want that outcome. Unless he has knowledge, or 
belief, concerning which acts would lead to the desired outcome, he might 
select acts which do not lead to it at all. We can imagine cases, indeed, in 
which there are sequences of  basic acts which, if  performed by S at appro- 
priate times, would lead to whichever outcome he might desire, and yet 
where S is counter-potent w.r.t, the issue! S might be so confused or mis- 
informed that if he wanted e he would perform acts that would lead to 
not-e, and if he wanted not-e he would perform acts that would lead to e. 
Under these circumstances, we would hardly say that S has power w.r.t.E. 
We may conclude, therefore, that the possession of power w.r.t, an issue 
depends not only on the possession of physical or social resources, but 
also on the possession of informational resources. Hence the maxim 
'Knowledge is power'. 
It  must be acknowledged that there are certain uses of the term 'power' 
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- especially as a count-noun - in which informational resources seem 
irrelevant. To take an example of Rogers Albritton's, a man who is en- 
dowed with a capacity to strike people dead by uttering a magic formula 
can be said to possess this special 'power" even though he does know that 
he has this power, and even though he has no idea what the formula is. 
Similarly, we may speak of an officer of an organization as having certain 
powers even if he happens to be ignorant of the fact that he has these 
powers. In this use of  the term 'power', a power simply seems to be a re- 
source of  a crucial sort, though not necessarily a resource which is suffi- 
cient, by itself, to ensure any particular desired outcome. 
Having noted this use, however, I propose henceforth to ignore it. I am 
interested primarily in the conditions under which a person has power 
over, or w.r.t., an issue, and the possession of  power w.r.t, an issue does 
seem to require informational resources. Suppose S is standing in a large 
mansion which contains, unknown to S, a hidden button; if this button is 
pressed, New York City will be destroyed. Suppose, moreover, that there 
is a sequence of basic acts which, if performed by S, would uncover the 
button and place him in a position to destroy the city. Does it follow that 
S has power w.r.t, the destruction of the city (say, in the next ten minutes)? 
I f  S has no idea whatever where the button is, and if S has no way of  
finding out where the button is (in the next ten minutes), then I think it is 
clear that S does not have power w.r.t, this issue. Thus, the absence of  
relevant information implies the absence of  power.7 
A precise statement of the required information, however, is difficult 
to formulate. It  is not necessary that S know, for each outcome e and 
not-e, which sequence of basic acts would be appropriate; it is not even 
necessary that he believe - in the sense o f  believe it to be more probable than 
not - of any sequence that it would lead to the desired outcome. It is suffi- 
cient for S to believe, of  a certain sequence which happens to be appro- 
priate, that it is more l ikely  than any other sequence to lead to the given 
outcome; this is sufficient even if he thinks that the chances of  its leading 
to that outcome are very small. To introduce some terminology to cover 
this possibility, we may say that it is sufficient that S 'epistemically favors' 
that sequence as a means to that outcome. 
Further complications are introduced by temporal considerations. In 
order for S to have power at tl it is not necessary that S be able at q to 
select an entire sequence of  basic acts. If, at q,  S has a kit for assembling a 
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harpsichord, then he may have power, at tx, w.r.t, the issue of  whether or 
not there will be a harpsichord in his house at t, (say, two months later). 
But there certainly is no entire sequence of  basic acts which S epistemically 
favors, at tl, as a means to obtaining the outcome of there being a harpsi- 
chord in his house at t,,. There are certain basic acts which S epistemically 
favors as initial members of  such a sequence, viz., acts that would enable 
him to read the instruction manual. Moreover, once he performs these 
initial acts, his reading of the instruction manual will lead him to form 
beliefs concerning further basic acts to perform. But at no point does he 
have the entire sequence of appropriate basic acts in mind. Extrapolating 
from this case, we can say that S would obtain an outcome e, if he wanted 
it, as long as the following is true: 
There is a sequence of  basic acts A 1 . . . .  , A~,..., A, such that 
(A) at ta S epistemically favors A~ as the first act to perform as 
a means to e, 
(B) for every i (1 ~< i ~< n-l), if S performed the first i members of  
the sequence from t~ through t~ (assuming that each act is 
performed at a single moment), then S would epistemically 
favor, at h+l,  act A~+I as the next act to perform as a means 
to e, and 
(C) if S performed each of the acts Ai at time fi (1 ~< i ~< n), then 
e would occur (at t,). 
In the foregoing discussion I have talked as if the only factors that de- 
termine which basic acts S performs are, first, his desire for a particular 
outcome of E, and, second, his beliefs concerning the various means avail- 
able to him to secure this outcome. In general, however, other desires and 
aversions come into play as well, not just S's attitude vis4t-vis the out- 
comes of  E. For  example, although S wants e to occur, and although he 
epistemically favors sequence A * as a means to e, he may choose a differ- 
ent sequence of basic acts because he expects A * to be very costly, that is, 
because he thinks A * will have consequences he wants to avoid. In short, 
an agent's choice of action normally depends on more than one desire, and 
since more than one desire is involved, the relative strength of  these de- 
sires is also an important factor. In the present section, however, I am 
intentionally neglecting these complications. I am assuming that S's de- 
sire for e (or for not-e) is the only motivating factor in his selection of  a 
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course of  action. Since it is the only motivating factor, its strength or inten- 
sity is of no significance. I f  S wants e he will perform whatever acts he 
epistemically favors as a means to e, and if he wants not-e he will perform 
whatever acts he epistemically favors as a means to not-e. In Section IV I 
shall drop these simplifying assumptions, but they will be retained until 
then. 
Since our analysis makes central use of  subjunctive conditionals, 
several remarks on their interpretation are in order. My approach to sub- 
junctive conditionals follows the general lines of the analysis proposed by 
Robert  Stalnaker. s On this analysis, we assess the truth of any conditional 
' I f  A then B' by considering a possible world in which A is true and which 
otherwise differs minimally from the actual world. A conditional of  this 
form is true if and only i fB  is true in that possible world. Now i fA is true 
in the actual world, the possible world we select is the actual world; but if 
A is contrary to fact, we must select some non-actual possible world. 
The tricky matter here is to select the respects in which this possible world 
should resemble the actual world and the respects (other than A itself) in 
which it may differ. In other words, we must decide what, in addition to 
A, is to be counterfactualized and what is to be held constant, sa One con- 
straint is that the possible world must be a nomologically consistent world 
(using the laws of nature of  the actual world); but more must be said 
about the selection of  a possible world. 
When we are interested in S's power, at tl, w.r.t. E (at t,), we begin by 
counterfactualizing S's desire vis-h-vis E, more specifically, his desire 
vis-~t-vis E from t 1 through t,. While counterfactualizing this desire, 
however, the following three things are held constant: (1) the basic 
act repertoire of  S, (2) the set of  beliefs that S has at q ,  and (3) S's re- 
sources at t~. The notion of resources is here construed very broadly, to 
include not only physical conditions, such as the presence of clouds, but 
also the acts and inclinations of other persons (at q).  Thus, to say that we 
hold constant the resources S has at t~ is to say, roughly, that we hold 
constant the state o f  the entire worm at tl - w i t h  the exception, of  course, 
of  S's own desire vis-fi-vis E and whatever is nomologically implied by that 
desire (e.g., the state of  his brain). Now once we have counterfactualized 
S's desire vis-fi-vis E, other counterfactualizations wil have to be made in 
order to obtain a nomologically consistent world. In particular, if S's 
desire from t~ through t, is different from his desire vis-~.-vis E in the ac- 
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tual world, the basic acts he performs from tl through tn will presumably 
be different (at least many of these acts). Moreover, if these acts are differ- 
ent, various other events that are causally connected with these acts will 
be different. Thus, once we have been forced to counterfactualize the ba- 
sic acts S performs, we shall also have to counterfactualize numerous oth- 
er events, including, perhaps, the acts of other agents and the beliefs S him- 
self forms after tl (which in turn influence his subsequent acts). Of para- 
mount importance is a possible change in the outcome of E. Since we are 
interested in S's power w.r.t. E, the crucial question is whether the coun- 
terfactual hypothesis that S desires, say, outcome e nomologically im- 
plies the performance of basic acts which nomologically imply the occur- 
rence of outcome e (at tn). 
Our discussion of individual power has heretofore assumed that every 
issue has exactly two possible outcomes; and, working on this assump- 
tion, we have maintained that a person has power w.r.t, an issue only if he 
can obtain each of these possible outcomes. Both of these assumptions, 
however, are too restrictive. Most of the interesting issues in the social or 
political arena admit of more than two possible outcomes, and when this 
is so, it is not necessary, in order for a person to have power, that he be 
able to obtain each of the various possible outcomes. Suppose, for exam- 
ple, that money is to be allocated for a certain project, and there are 50 
possible amounts that might be allocated: $1 million, $ 2 million,..., $ 49 
million, $ 50 million. Now suppose that although S is not able to ensure 
whichever of these 50 allocations he might desire, he is in a position to 
ensure any of the first 20 of these allocations. In this case, S clearly has 
power w.r.t, the issue of how much money is to be allocated for the proj- 
ect. On the other hand, if S is in a position to ensure any of the first 40 of 
these allocations, rather than any of the first 20, then S has even more 
power w.r.t, this issue. 
To accommodate this sort of case, we proceed as follows. First, instead 
of defining an issue in terms of a partition of outcomes, we think of a single 
issue as subject to a variety of different possible partitions. For example, 
we may take the single issue of the weather (at a particular time and place) 
and partition it into any of the following partitions, where each partition 
contains outcomes that are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive: 
(1) (a) rain, (b) non-rain; (2) (a) rain, (b) snow, (c) hail, (d) anything else; 
(3) (a) sunny, (b) cloudy, (c) precipitation; (4) (a) no precipitation, (b) less 
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than an inch of  precipitation, (c) an inch or more of precipitation; etc. 9 
Once we have the idea of  different partitions of the same issue, we can 
make the following generalizations. I f  there is any partition of E into two 
or more mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive outcomes such that S 
can obtain the occurrence of  at least two of  the outcomes of this partition, 
then S has at least some power w.r . t .E.  Moreover, consider any partition 
P of  E into possible outcomes el,  e2, ..., e,, where n~> 2. (For simplicity, 
I confine our attention to finite partitions.) Call the set of  these n possible 
outcomes E*. I f  we wish to compare S's power w.r.t. E in one possible 
world (where S possesses certain resources) with S's power w.r.t. E in 
another possible world (where he possesses different resources), we pro- 
ceed as follows. We consider subsets E '  and E" of E*, where E" contains 
at least two members. Then if the following three conditions are satisfied, 
S has morepower  w.r.t. E i n  possible world W2 than he has w.r.t. E i n  W1 : 
(a) in WI subset E '  is the largest subset o rE*  such that S can obtain which- 
ever member he chooses, (b) in W2 subset E" is the largest subset of  E* such 
that S can obtain whichever member he chooses, and (c) E" is a proper 
subset of  E". lo 
II. COLLECTIVE P O W E R  
I have focused until now on the power of  a single person, but this barely 
touches the more important complexities in the topic of  power. Most 
issues of  interest in the social arena are issues in which many persons and 
many groups have some degree of  power. Moreover, we are usually in- 
clined to say, in such cases, that some of  these people or groups have more 
power than others. Nothing I have said thus far, however, sheds light on 
these matters. I have said nothing concerning the power of  groups of  
people, nor anything about  comparisons of  power between two or more 
persons (or groups). An adequate theory of  power, obviously, must deal 
with these matters. 
The problems that lurk in these areas can be conveniently introduced by 
a brief passage from an article in New York Magazine entitled "The Ten 
Most Powerful Men in New York."  Having listed his choice for the ten most 
powerful men in New York, the author, Dick Schaap, writes as follows: 
I offer only one theory in defense of the above list: if all ten men agreed upon the 
wisdom and necessity of a single, specific act affecting New York City, that  act would 
take place, no matter how the rest of the city's eight million people felt. 11 
In passing, we may note two obvious deficiencies in Schaap's suggestion, 
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at least if it is regarded as a criterion for determining the ten most power- 
ful men. First, it is too strong. It is not necessary that the ten most power- 
ful men would always get their way despite the attitudes of all other New 
Yorkers. Secondly, the test does not ensure uniqueness. A number of  
different groups of ten  men might each satisfy the test. 
But let us reflect on other features of the test. It is noteworthy that 
Schaap's test does not require any one of the ten to be able to obtain out- 
comes by himself; that is, it does not require that there be any issue such 
that at least one of the ten would obtain different outcomes of that issue 
if he wanted them. The test can be satisfied even if each of  the ten is only 
a member of a group whose joint preferences would determine the out- 
comes of  issues. This seems perfectly appropriate if we are considering the 
power of the group. But by calling these men "the ten most powerful," 
Schaap also implies that each of them has considerable power. This raises 
an interesting question for the account of power given in Section I. I f  
neither of two persons can individually get what he wants, but if the two of 
them can jointly get what they want, can either of  them be credited as a 
single person with power w.r.t, the issue? This point requires an investiga- 
tion both into the nature of group or collective power and into the rela- 
tionship between collective power and individual power. 
Another noteworthy feature of Schaap's ' theory' is the phrase 'no 
matter how the rest of the city's eight million people felt'. To complete 
Schaap's test of  a proposed list of  ten men, we must not only hypothesize 
that all ten agree in supporting a given outcome, but we must also hypoth- 
esize that all other New Yorkers oppose that outcome. Only if the ten men 
would achieve their outcome despite everyone else's opposition would it 
be true that they would achieve it "no matter how the rest of the city's eight 
million people felt," and only then would they qualify, on Schaap's test, 
as the ten most powerful. Schaap's requirement is reminiscent of a similar 
stipulation made by Max Weber, who defined 'power' as "the probability 
that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out 
his own will despite resistance .... ,,12 and of  C. Wright Mills' definition, 
"By the powerful we mean, of course, those who are able to realize their 
will, even i f  others resist it. ''18 Our own analysis of  power has made no 
reference to the resistance or opposition, either actual or hypothetical, of  
other persons. The place of  this idea in an account of  power must there- 
fore be explored. 
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In this section, however, we confine our attention to collective power. 
Suppose that you and I, both healthy and reasonably normal men, are 
standing behind a stalled Buick. I f  either of  us alone pushes at it, the car 
will not budge; but if we both push simultaneously, it will move. Let E be 
the issue of the movement of the Buick (in the next several seconds) and 
let E be partitioned into two outcomes: (e) it moves, and (not-e) it does 
not move. If  both of us want outcome e to occur, then we shall both push 
at the car and outcome e will take place. I f  both of us want not-e, neither 
of  us will push and not-e will take place. Thus, if we jointly desire either 
outcome, that outcome will occur. This is a good reason to conclude that 
the two of us have colleetivepower w.r.t, issue E. It appears, however, that 
neither of  us has individual power w.r.t .E. True enough, if one of us want- 
ed not-e, he would ensure that not-e would occur even if the other wanted 
e (or was neutral on the issue). But if only one of  us wanted outcome e, 
while the other wanted not-e, the one who preferred e would not succeed 
in getting his way. It does not seem to be true of either of us, therefore, 
that for at least two outcomes of E, he would get his way on each outcome 
if he wanted that outcome. Actually, this conclusion is too hasty, as we 
shall see below. There is no doubt, however, that we must distinguish 
between collective power and individual power, and that collective power 
deserves study in its own right. 
An analysis of collective power can easily be constructed along the lines 
of  our analysis of individual power. For  simplicity we confine our atten- 
tion to two-outcome partitions. 
A group of  persons $1 .. . . .  Si . . . . .  S,, have collective power, at t 1, w.r.t. 
issue E (at t,) i f  and only i f  
(H) (1) There is a set o f  sequences o f  basic act-types, a sequence 
for each person Si, such that 
(a) i f  each person Si wanted outcome e to occur, each would 
perform his respective sequence of  acts at appropriate 
times between tl and t n, and 
(b) i f  each person Si performed his sequence at appropriate 
times, then e would occur (at tn) ; 
(2) There is a set o f  sequences o f  basic act-types, a sequence 
for each person St, such that 
(a) i f  each person Si wanted outcome not-e to occur, each 
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would perform his respective sequence of  acts at appro- 
priate times between tl and tn, and 
(b) i f  each person S~ performed his sequence at appropriate 
times, then not-e would occur (at tn). 
Paralleling the case of individual power, there are two kinds or classes 
of resources that are relevant to the possession of collective power. First, 
informational resources are needed to satisfy clauses (1) (a) and (2) (a) 
of the analysis. Secondly, non-informational resources of  various sorts 
are needed to satisfy clauses (1) (b) and (2) (b). Nothing especially distinc- 
tive is true of the class of non-informational resources, but some attention 
to informational (or epistemic) resources should be instructive. 
In collective action toward a common goal, coordination is usually re- 
quired in the selection of mutually supportive sequences of acts. For me to 
choose an appropriate sequence I may have to know what other members 
of the group are going to do; and similarly for each of them. Without 
information of this sort we may act discordantly despite good intentions. 
Often, therefore, acts performed in order to achieve a given outcome are 
designed to acquire information about future acts of partners in the under- 
taking. The nature of coordinative activity is a fascinating subject, which 
need not be expanded upon here. 14 It is (partly) the need for coordination, 
however, that makes the degree of organization or structural delineation 
of a group contribute to its power. An established pattern of division of 
labor facilitates the mutual selection of appropriate courses of action. The 
political power of lobbies and pressure groups, as opposed to that of 
random collections of individuals (e.g., until recently, consumers), is 
partly a function of this factor. 
Two aspects of the problem of coordination should be distinguished. 
First, I may need information about the acts of others to decide which acts 
would be appropriate for me to perform. Secondly, even if I know which 
acts of mine are the ones most likely to lead to the desired outcome, I 
may need to know what others are going to do in order to assess how like- 
ly it is that the performance of these acts will be followed by the outcome. 
In particular, if  I believe that others will not 'do their part', and if I be- 
lieve that it will be very costly for me to perform my most appropriate 
sequence of acts, then even if I know which sequence of acts would be 
most appropriate for me to perform (as a means to the desired outcome), 
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I may choose not to perform them. Admittedly, this consideration intro- 
duces the element of cost, which we resolved to abstract from until Sec- 
tion IV. Nevertheless, it is sufficiently important in this context that it 
should not be ignored. 
Suppose that a small group of bandits are holding up a train containing 
a large number of passengers. How shall we assess the collective power of 
the passengers w.r.t, the issue of whether or not they will be robbed? 
Suppose that the bandits 'have the drop' on the passengers, but that there 
is a set of sequences of acts, a sequence for each passenger, such that if 
they performed these sequences of acts, they would disarm the bandits 
(with no harm to themselves) and foil the robbery. Assume further that 
each passenger knows which acts would be the most appropriate ones for 
him to perform as a means to foiling the robbery. This is not enough to 
ensure that all would perform these acts if all wanted the robbery to be 
foiled. The rub, of course, is that each passenger has little reason to believe 
(indeed, has strong reason to disbelieve) that enough other passengers will 
do their part. Since, for each passenger, it would be very costly if he did 
his part (e.g., started to disarm the bandit nearest him) while few others 
did theirs, each passenger would refrain from doing these acts, and the 
robbery would succeed. A similar problem arises in assessing the power 
of a large group of slaves over a small group of masters. If all the slaves 
acted in unison, they would overwhelm their masters. But it does not 
follow that they have much (or any) collective power over their masters. 
Like the train passengers, the problem for the slaves is that each is insuf- 
ficiently confident that rebellious action on his part would be supported 
by others. There is an important respect, then, in which 'faith is power'. 
To the extent that members of a group have greater confidence in the 
reliability of their partners (and hence greater confidence in the efficacy of 
their own acts as part of the larger group) the group itself has more 
power, or is more likely to have at least s o m e  power w.r.t, a selected issue. 
With a clearer grasp of the notion of collective power, let us next look 
more closely at the relationship between collective and individual power. 
In our discussion of the Buick example it was said that this is a case where 
you and I have collective power w.r.t, its movement but where neither of 
us has individual power w.r.t, its movement. Closer examination shows, 
however, that this is not unconditionally true: it depends on further spec- 
ification of the example. Suppose, first, that you are not going to push at 
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the Buick in the next few seconds, and that there are no acts I could per- 
form that would induce you to push. In that case, there is no sequence of  
basic acts I could perform that would lead to the car's moving (in the next 
few seconds). Hence, it is correct to say that I lack individual power w.r.t. 
the issue. But suppose now that, as a matter  of fact, you are going to push 
at the Buick in the next few seconds (and suppose that you have no incli- 
nation not to push in case I push). In that case, (I') licenses us to say that I 
do have individual power w.r.t, the issue, for your  act of  pushing serves 
as a 'resource' of  mine. I f  I wanted the car to move I would push at it, 
and, given your  pushing as a resource, this would lead to the car's moving. 
I f  I wanted the car not to move, I would not push it, and in this case, 
despite your  pushing, it would not move. Thus, whichever outcome I 
wanted would occur. 
This example brings out the true contrast between collective power and 
individual power (as we have defined these notions). The difference be- 
tween them lies in the conditions that we counterfactualize in each case. 
In making a judgment about the individual power of  a person S at tl, we 
begin by counterfactualizing his desire (from tl through t,) and his desire 
only. The only other counterfactualizations that we allow are ones that 
follow from, or are necessitated by, this initial counterfactualization. 
In particular, we do not counterfactualize the desires or acts of  other per- 
sons unless those desires and acts would be affected by the difference in 
S's desire. In making a judgment about the collective power at t~ of  a 
group of  persons, we begin differently. We begin by counterfactualizing 
at the outset the desires of  all of  the members of  the group. We ask what 
would happen if they all wanted outcome e (from t~ through t,) and what 
would happen if they all wanted outcome not-e (from t~ through t,). 
Thus, in individual power we consider all persons other than S purely as 
'resources' (or liabilities) of  his; in collective power we consider all per- 
sons outside the group purely as resources. 
Let us return to the case where you and I have collective power w.r.t. 
the movement of  the Buick but neither of us has individual power (this 
is the case where neither of  us is in fact  going to push, but where the car 
would move if we both wanted it to move). According to the analysis of  
Section I it should be concluded that neither of  us has any power w.r.t. 
the issue; for it was implied in Section I that a person has power w.r.t, an 
issue only if he has individual power w.r.t, it. This assumption, however, 
240 A L V I N  I. G O L D M A N  
must now be called into question. As noted earlier, Schaap's formula 
implicitly denies it; for Schaap's formula allows a person to be one of  the 
ten most powerful men in New York simply by being a member of  a group 
that has collective power. What Schaap's formula suggests, then, is some 
sort of  distributive principle: if a group of persons has collective power 
w.r.t, an issue, then every member of the group has power w.r.t, the issue. 
This formulation, however, is too strong. If  group G has collective power 
w.r.t. E, another group G' can always be formed by adding to G some 
randomly selected, irrelevant person; and this new group, G', will also 
have collective power w.r. t .E. But we do not want to say of any randomly 
selected person that he has power w.r.t .E. A qualification is needed, there- 
fore, to the effect that each member must be non-dispensable w.r.t .E. This 
notion can be explained as follows. I f  there is at least one outcome of  E 
such that (a) if all members of G wanted that outcome it would occur, and 
(b) if all members of  G except S wanted that outcome, whereas S opposed 
it, it would not occur, then S is a non-dispensable member of G w.r,t. E. 
In the Buick case, for example, you and I have collective power w.r.t, the 
issue, and each of  us is a non-dispensable member of  this group (w.r.t. 
this issue). We can now formulate the following principle. 
A person S has somepower w.r.t, issue E i f  there is some group 
G such that S is a non-dispensable member of  G w.r.t. E and 
the members of  G have collective power w.r.t. E. 
This principle proves useful in a variety of cases. In the Buick case, 
for example, although neither of us has individual power w.r.t, the issue, 
it seems plausible to say that each of us has some power, i.e., that neither 
of  us is powerless w.r.t, it. The new principle licenses us to say this. 
The principle also permits us to account for the power of each member 
of  a legislature. To illustrate, consider an assembly of 100 legislators, in 
which 51 votes are required to pass a proposal and 50 to defeat it. Let E be 
the issue of  whether a particular bill is passed and let us assume that the 
actual vote is 75 in favor and 25 opposed. Consider legislator S who in 
fact voted for the bill. Did he have power w.r.t. E? Assume that S did not 
have individual power, for the bill would have passed even if he had op- 
posed it. Was S a non-dispensable member of  a group which had collective 
power w.r.t. E? Yes, Let group G consist of 25 members of  the assembly, 
including S, each of  whom actually voted for the bill. Then, holding 
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constant the attitudes of the 25 original opponents of  the bill and the 
remaining 50 supporters, we can say that if all members of  G (including 
S) wanted the bill to be passed, it would have been passed, and if all mem- 
bers of  G (including S) wanted the bill to be defeated, it would have been 
defeated. Thus, G had collective power w.r . t .E.  But if all members of G 
except for S wanted the bill defeated, whereas S wanted it passed, then it 
would not have been defeated. Thus, S was a non-dispensable member of 
G w.r.t. E, and hence he had some power w.r.t .E. 
Consider next a rather different case. Let E be the issue of  whether 
Brown will be alive at noon today. At 11:00 a.m. Smith has a loaded gun 
in his hand, aimed at Brown, and Smith has the requisite beliefs such that 
he would kill Brown before noon if he wanted Brown dead and he would not 
kill Brown if he wanted him alive. A third man, Jones, is also in a position to 
kill Brown by noon. Moreover, Jones is resolved to kill Brown before 
noon if (and only if) Smith does not kill Brown. Finally, assume that 
Smith cannot influence Jones' action in this matter. Now in this situation 
we are surely inclined to say that Smith has some power w.r. t .E. Accord- 
ing to the account of individual power, though, Smith does not have indi- 
vidual power (at 11:00) w.r . t .E.  15 Given the facts concerning Jones, it 
turns out that there is nothing Smith can do that would lead to Brown's 
being alive at noon;  so Smith is impotent w.r.t. E, for Brown will be dead 
at noon no matter what Smith wants or does about it. 
Using the new principle, however, we can account for the intuition that 
Smith does have at least some power w.r.t .E. For  Smith is a non-dispens- 
able member of  a group (viz., Smith and Jones) which has collective pow- 
er w.r . t .E.  Smith and Jones have collective power w.r.t. E because if they 
both wanted Brown dead at noon that outcome would ensue, and if they 
both wanted Brown to be alive at noon they would perform acts leading to 
that outcome. Smith is a non-dispensable member of  this group w.r.t. E 
because if Jones wanted Brown to be alive while Smith opposed it, then 
Brown would not be alive (at noon). 
I I I .  C O N F L I C T  A N D  C O M P A R I S O N S  OF P O W E R  
We turn now to the significance of  conflict or opposition in the criteria of  
power offered by Schaap, Weber and Mills. Schaap, it will be recalled, 
characterized the ten most powerful men in New York as the ten that 
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would get their way no matter how the rest of the city's people felt about 
it. Whether or not this criterion is adequate, its rationale is clear. To deter- 
mine relative amounts of power between people (or groups), it is appro- 
priate to ask who would 'get his way', i.e., who would get his preferred 
outcome, in case of conflict. Schaap does not suggest (nor do Weber and 
Mills) that power is present only in situations of actual conflict or oppo- 
sition. What is suggested, though, is that comparisons of power can be 
made by ascertaining what would happen / f the re  were conflict or oppo- 
sition. Since comparisons of power are of central concern, let us reflect on 
on this matter. I shall not try to deal with the relative power of  groups, 
nor with the relative power of  three or more individuals. I shall confine my 
attention to comparisons between two individuals (although third-parties 
will have to be mentioned to clarify the nature of the two-person case). 
Let us begin with an example. Jones and I are both standing next to an 
open door. Jones is a muscular 250-pounder and I a 145-pounder. Let E 
be the issue of  whether or not the door remains open. I f  both Jones and I 
can rely on raw strength alone, it is pretty clear that he has more power 
than I do w.r. t .E.  For  there is a sequence of basic acts Jones can perform 
to ensure, no matter what basic acts I perform, that the door will stay 
open; and there is a sequence of  acts Jones can perform that would ensure 
that the door  will be dosed, no matter what basic acts I perform. (Here we 
rely on the fact that Jones' basic act repertoire exceeds mine: he can exert 
a greater amount  of pressure on the door than I can.) Thus, assuming 
Jones has the requisite beliefs, the door would stay open if Jones wanted 
it open, no matter how I felt about it; and the door would be closed if 
Jones wanted it closed, no matter how I might feel about it. Should Jones 
and I have opposing preferences, then, Jones' preferred outcome would 
be the one to occur. 
In this example, Jones can perform a certain sequence of basic acts such 
that, no matter what basic acts I perform, the door will stay open; and 
similarly for the door being dosed. Is this sort of relationship generally 
necessary in order that one person have more power than another w.r.t, an 
issue? Restricting our attention to partitions with two outcomes, this 
would be generalized as follows: $1 has more power than $2 w.r.t. E only 
if, for each of  the two outcomes, there exists a sequence of  basic acts $1 
can perform such that, for any sequence of basic acts $2 might perform, 
the performance of  the sequence by S 1 would lead to this outcome. Such 
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a requirement is dearly too strong. It demands the existence of a single 
course of action for $1 that would 'win' in the face of all possible re- 
sponses from $2. A weaker requirement is therefore needed. The condi- 
tion that naturally suggests itself next is this: For each of the two out- 
comes, no matter what basic acts $2 might perform, there is a sequence of 
basic acts S 1 could perform that would lead to this outcome. This condi- 
tion is too weak. The statement that for any course of action by $2 there 
is a 'winning' course of action for S~ is compatible with the statement 
that for any course of action by S~ there is a 'winning' course of action for 
$2.16 So this requirement would not provide even prima facie grounds for 
thinking that S~ has more power than $2. 
The next natural suggestion is to appeal to the game-theoretic notion 
of a winning strategy. What would be required is that for each outcome, 
e and not-e, there be a strategy or function F which assigns to S~ an 
initial move and which, for every set of possible moves of $2, assigns to 
S~ a succeeding move (or moves), such that if $1 were to abide by this 
function, that outcome would occur. In fact, however, even this require- 
ment is too strong. The existence of a winning strategy for S~ implies that 
S~ can win no matter what $2 does, in other words, even if $2 adopts the 
best strategy available to him. But suppose that $2 does not have infor- 
mation that would lead him to adopt (what is in fact) his best strategy. 
Then S~ may be in a position to 'beat' $2 even if S~ lacks a winning strat- 
egy (i.e., a strategy that would win for S~ against a// possible strategies of 
$2). In fact, $2 might even have a winning strategy against S~; yet if $2 
does not know what this strategy is, and has no way to find out, then S 1 
may have more power than $2 in spite of this. His having more power 
would simply consist in the fact that he would get his preferred outcome 
(by an appropriate course of action) if the two of them had opposing 
preferences. 
Let us abandon the attempt to specify in detail what combinations of 
strategy-and-information would be necessary and sufficient for S~ to 
have more power than $2. Instea~l, we can give a simple analysis of this 
notion that parallels our earlier analyses of individual power and collec- 
tive power. 
At tl $1 has more power than $2 w.r.t, issue E (at t,) i f  and 
only if." 
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(III) (1) There is a pair of  sequences of basic act-types, ~1 and ~2, 
such that 
(a) i f  $1 wanted outcome e and i f  $2 wanted outcome not-e, 
then $1 would perform 2~ at certain times between t~ 
and t n and S2 would perform 22 at certain times between 
t 1 andtn, and 
(b) i f  $1 were to perform X1 at these times and i f  Sz were to 
perform S2 at these times, then outcome e wouM occur 
(at tn) ; 
(2) There is a pair of  sequences of  basic act-types, 2'1 and 2'2, 
such that 
(a) i f  $1 wanted outcome not-e and i f  $2 wanted outcome e, 
then $1 would perform 2'1 at certain times between t 1 
and tn andS 2 would perform 2"2 at certain times between 
t i and t n, and 
(b) i f  S1 were to perform X'I at these times and i f  $2 were 
to perform 2'2 at these times, then outcome not-e would 
occur (at t,). 
We might wish to add clauses to the analysis to ensure that S 1 would get 
his preferred outcome if Sz were neutral on the issue, but this refinement 
may be neglected. A far more important refinement concerns the elabora- 
tion of the analysis to cover partitions of three or more outcomes. 17 But 
this complication will also have to be omitted here. 
As in the case of collective action, selections of sequences of acts by 
actors with opposing interests are typically interdependent. If $1 and $2 
realize that they have conflicting preferences, each will be guided in his 
choice of action by whatever information he has about the acts his oppo- 
nent has performed or plans to perform in the future. As before, informa- 
tional resources are crucial in determining the acts one would select, and 
therefore important in determining one's relative power. 
In our door example we imagined that both Jones and I rely on our own 
strength alone. In characteristic situations in the political sphere, however, 
relative power depends on other assets, including positions of influence 
over other persons that stem from authority, kinship, personal magnetism, 
or other relationships. In seeking to achieve one's ends in opposition to 
others, one frequently performs acts designed to call forth aid from other 
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persons. These acts might be orders, commands, or simple requests for 
help. To illustrate the importance of this, let us revise the door example to 
include a brawny and faithful companion of mine who is always willing 
and able to assist me. In this amended case it is no longer true that Jones 
would get his preferred outcome if his preference were in opposition to 
mine. If I wanted the door to be closed, for example, I would perform 
basic acts by which I would ask my friend for help, and then I would 
perform acts of pushing at the door which, in unison with my friend's 
pushing, would ensure that the door be closed even if Jones tries to keep 
it open. Thus, given my brawny and faithful companion, I would get 
whichever outcome I would prefer on the door issue, no matter how Jones 
might feel about it. 
Is it true, however, that I have more power than Jones w.r.t. E? There 
may be a strong temptation to deny this. It might well be argued that it is 
only the power of the two of us, my companion and me, that exceeds the 
power of Jones. This view can be defended by pointing out that if we are 
considering hypothetical desires, and hypothetical sequences of acts, we 
should also consider hypothetical desires and acts by the companion. If we 
do this, we shall quicldy see that I do not have the ability, given any desires 
and acts by my companion, to beat Jones at whatever he tries to do. I 
could be said to have this ability only on the assumption that the compan- 
ion's desires and acts are wholly contingent on mine. But why should this 
contingency or dependency be assumed? Admittedly, I introduced the 
example by saying that the companion is willing to do my bidding, and it 
would violate this stipulation to hypothesize that I ask him for help but 
that he does not desire (on the whole) to do what I ask him to do. But why 
should such a hypothesis not be permitted? In talking about power we 
are already in the business of making counterfactual assumptions about 
various people's desires and acts. Why not make counterfactual assump- 
tions about the companion's desires and acts as well? The problem, in 
short, is this: When making comparisons of power between individuals 
(or, indeed, in making non-comparative judgments of power), what 
should be regarded as fixed and what should be regarded as a candidate 
for counterfactualization ? 
The answer I propose is that it all depends on what sorts of power com- 
parisons we wish to make. If we wish to compare Jones and myself, then 
our desires and acts are subject to counterfactualization, while the desires 
246 A L V I N  I. G O L D M A N  
and acts of everyone else are to be taken as contingent on ours - at least, 
if there is anything in the actual world that makes their desires and acts 
contingent on ours. In other words, in comparing the power of Jones and 
myself, the initial changes we make in constructing different possible 
worlds concern the desires of Jones and myself; the only other changes 
that are made are ones nomologicatly required by these initial changes. 
On the other hand, if we wish to compare the power of Jones, myself, and 
my companion, then we would make initial counterfactuatizations in- 
volving my companion's desires as well. Because of these different coun- 
terfactuals, of course, different assessments of power are going to be made. 
There is nothing inconsistent or paradoxical about this, however; it 
merely reflects the fact that whenever judgments about power are made, 
certain things are subjected to counterfactualization and others held 
fixed. A judgment about a person's power that makes certain counter- 
factualizations cannot be expected to be identical with a judgment that 
makes different (initial) counterfactualizations. Within certain limits, 
however, a number of different counterfactual assumptions may legiti- 
mately be made. 18 
To illustrate these points consider a departmental secretary who is 
given substantial responsibility and initiative by the chairman. If  we ask 
about the secretary's power w.r.t, a variety of issues (e.g., assignment of 
offices, teaching hours, classrooms, etc.) it is not so clear what should be 
said. On the one hand we may hold fixed, or constant, the chairman's 
propensity to go along with the secretary's decisions; in other words, we 
regard the chairman's trust as one of the secretary's resources. If  so, we 
would attribute considerable power to the secretary. On the other hand, 
we may also compare the secretary's power with that of the chairman; we 
might ask what would happen if the secretary wanted one outcome and 
the chairman preferred a contrary one. Normally the chairman would 
win in such cases (let us suppose), and hence the secretary's power is less 
than the chairman's. 
I think we can see from this that a clear, overall picture of someone's 
power (w.r.t. a given issue) demands a consideration of more than his 
individual power (as defined in Section I); it also requires attention to his 
power relative to other persons (and groups of persons). This is a point 
that is implicit in Weber's and Mills' characterizations of power as the 
ability to get one's way despite (possible) resistance. That individual power 
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by itself does not give us the whole story is evident in the following exam- 
ple. Suppose that S* has a rain-making machine, and this gives him pow- 
er w.r.t, the noon-time weather (since, in the natural course of events, it 
would not rain at noon). St4ppose, in addition, that if S were humbly to 
beg and plead with S* to make rain for him (S), then S* would accede to 
S's wishes. If so, then according to our analysis of 'individual power', S 
has individual power w.r.t, the noon-time weather.  But clearly, if S's 
only way of affecting the weather is by throwing himself on S*'s mercy, 
we would not be inclined to credit S with much power w.r.t, the weather. 
This can be explained in terms of our theory by appeal to a comparison of 
power between S and S*. It is obvious that S*'s power w.r.t, the weather 
exceeds that of S. And this must be taken seriously in one's overall ap- 
praisal of S's power w.r.t, the weather. 
An important problem arises here, however. Suppose that S is able to 
influence S* to use his rain-making machine, not by pleading with S*, 
but by threatening him with dire consequences should he (S*) refuse to 
employ the machine to make rain. Here we would say that S has quite a 
lot of power w.r.t, the weather, more, at any rate, than in the previous 
example. This difference, however, cannot be captured by our account of 
comparative power, at least not by the account as it stands now. For even 
in this case our account of comparative power would have us say that S* 
has more power than S w.r.t, the weather. This is because/fS* wanted 
non-rain on the whole - despite S's threat - then non-rain would occur. 19 
What this shows is that our analysis of comparative power must be sup- 
plemented or refined in some further way. As our discussion intimates, 
the needed refinement concerns the element of cost. The difference be- 
tween pleading and threatening is that the latter imposes (prospective) 
costs on S* which the former does not (at least not such heavy costs). 
By making use of the notion of cost, we can hope to develop an account 
of comparative power that will handle the difference we have detected. 
IV. COST A N D  D E G R E E S  OF P O W E R  
The necessity of incorporating the element of cost into our theory was 
acknowledged early in the paper but posponed until now. Heretofore we 
have assumed that the only factor motivating the choice of a person's 
action is his desire or aversion for outcomes of issue E. As noted earlier, 
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though,  this a s sumpt ion  is unrealist ic .  The  pe r fo rmance  o f  a sequence o f  
acts of ten leads  to  undes i red  consequences ;  a t  a min imum,  i t  typica l ly  
involves the  expendi ture  o f  va luable  resources  or  assets. The  pe r fo rmance  
o f  a sequence o f  acts, then,  involves some cost. N o w  a l though  a pe r son  
m a y  wan t  ou t come  e, and  a l though  he m a y  believe tha t  the  pe r fo rmance  
o f  sequence 2; is the  only  way  for  h im to  get  e, he m a y  decide  no t  to 
p e r f o r m  ~ i f  the  expected cost  o f  pe r fo rming  i t  exceeds the  benefit  he 
would  get  f rom e. A direct ly  re la ted  po in t  we have neglected is the  fact  
tha t  a pe r son  can  wan t  an  ou tcome  to a greater  o r  lesser degree. W e  have 
a s sumed  unt i l  now tha t  a pe r son  ei ther  wants  e, wants  not-e,  o r  is neu t ra l  
between them;  we have no t  wor r ied  abou t  the  s t rength  (actual  or  hypo-  
thet ical)  o f  a desire. Once the e lement  o f  cost  is in t roduced ,  however ,  
s t rengths  o f  desire and  avers ion mus t  be  inc luded  as well, for  the choice 
o f  courses o f  ac t ion  will depend  on  whe ther  or  no t  the  value o f  an  ou tcome  
exceeds the  (expected) cost  o f  ob ta in ing  it. 
I n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  the  d e m e n t  o f  cost  has  immed ia t e  bear ing  on  power .  
As  we have  seen, the  expected  cos t  o f  a sequence o f  ac t ion  m a y  d issuade  
a pe r son  f rom pe r fo rming  tha t  sequence even i f  he wants  the  ou tcome  to 
which  (he believes) i t  will lead. I t  fol lows,  therefore,  tha t  the  cost  o f  a 
sequence is a de te rmin ing  fac tor  o f  whether  o r  no t  a pe r son  would get  a 
cer ta in  ou tcome  / f  he wan ted  i t  ( to such-and-such  a degree).  Hence,  
i t  is a de t e rmin ing  fac tor  o f  his p o w e r  w.r.t ,  an  issue. 
The  impor t ance  o f  cost  in  the analysis  o f  power  was first stressed by  
John  C. Harsanyi .  2~ H e  i l lustrates  the  idea  as follows. 
It is misleading to say that two political candidates have the same power over two 
comparable constituencies if one needs much more electioneering effort and expen- 
diture to achieve a given majority, even if in the end both achieve the same majorities; 
or that one can achieve favorable treatment by city officials only at the price of large 
donations to party funds, while the other can get the same favorable treatment just 
for the asking. 
Ha r sany i  stresses how inaccura te  an  analysis  o f  power  can  be i f  it  dis- 
regards  the  costs  to  an  agent .  
For instance, suppose that an army commander becomes a prisoner of enemy troops, 
who try to force him at gun point to give a radio order to his army units to withdraw 
from a certain area. He may well have the power to give a contrary order, both in 
the sense of having the physical ability to do so and in the sense of there being a 
very good chance of his order being actually obeyed by his army units - but he can 
use this power only at the cost of his life .... lilt would clearly be very misleading in 
this situation to call him a powerful individual in the same sense as before his capture. 
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To generalize this point, we can say that if it is extremely costly for an 
agent to obtain certain outcomes of  an issue - e.g., if it would require the 
sacrifice of  his life, health or fortune - then he cannot be said to have 
much power w.r.t, that issue. The amount of  power an agent has w.r.t. 
an issue is thus inversely proportional to the cost of  obtaining outcomes 
of  that issue. 
The dement  of cost, then, enters into the analysis of  power at the level 
of  individual power. But it is even more important when we turn to 
comparisons of  power, that is, when we consider what would happen in 
situations of conflict. When two persons have opposing preferences con- 
cerning an issue, one of them (or both) frequently tries to get his preferred 
outcome by the use of threats or sanctions designed to deter his opponent 
from performing certain acts. The intended effect of  a threat is not to 
make the opponent literally unable to perform a certain sequence of basic 
acts; rather it is to make that sequence more costly for him to perform. 
To the extent that the ability to deter people by successful threats is an 
essential ingredient in the possession of power, it is vital that we incor- 
porate the element of cost into our theory. How, exactly, may this element 
be incorporated? 
The first problem is how to construe the notion of  cost and how to 
measure it. The most promising approach, I think, is suggested by the 
economist's notion of  opportunity cost. To say that the achievement of  
outcome e would be costly for S is to say that the activity by which S 
might obtain e would have consequences that are less desirable, or have 
lower utility, than an alternative course of action open to S. I f  obtaining 
outcome e would require an expenditure of  money, then the cost of  
obtaining e is a function of  the utility that would have accrued to S from 
using the money in some alternative way. If  e can only be achieved at the 
cost of imprisonment, then the cost of obtaining e is a function of  the 
difference in utility between going to prison and remaining a free man. 
It is evident that in determing the cost of  an activity we must refer to the 
agent's desires, or utility assignments, for various outcomes. In this 
context, though, we consider the actual desires of  the agent, not hypo- 
thetical desires. True, we continue to regard desires vis4t-vis the outcomes 
of  the issue in question (e and not-e) as subject to counterfactualization. 
But other desires are held constant (at least so far as this is compatible 
with whatever counterfactualization is made). 21 Assume that a Senator 
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can obtain passage of a certain bill only if he engages in activity that would 
cost him his reelection. I f  he is in fact highly averse to losing the election, 
then the cost would be very high, and we shall say that his power w.r.t. 
the passage of the bill is correspondingly reduced. But if he in fact cares 
very little about reelection, then his cost is not so great, and he has more 
power w.r.t, the passage of the bill. 
Problems of cost become complicated when we turn to comparisons of 
power, and hence to (potential) conflict situations. The complications 
here are twofold. First, both agents, $1 and Sz, may be in a position to 
threaten his opponent with certain penalties, thereby imposing costs on 
the opponent. Secondly, however, the activity of posing these threats, or 
of making them credible, may be costly to the threatener himself. In 
assessing the relative power of St and Sz, therefore, all of the following 
must be combined: (1) the costs that S~ can impose on possible courses 
of action by Sz, (2) the costs to $1 of imposing these costs on $2, (3) the 
costs that Se can impose on possible courses of action by $1, and (4) the 
costs to Sz of imposing these costs on S~. 2~' 
To combine these elements and incorporate them into our theory of 
power, let us make use of matrices resembling those of game theory. In 
constructing such matrices the following assumptions will be adopted. 
(1) Issue E is partitioned, as usual, into two outcomes, e and not-e. 
(2) Two agents, Row and Column, have various sequences of basic 
acts open to them. For simplicity we depict only three sequences of acts 
for each agent. (3) It is assumed that inter-personal assignments of 
utility can be made. (4) A three-by-three matrix, like Matrix 1 below, gives 
information on three subjects. First, it says what outcome would occur if  
Row and Column were to choose certain sequence of acts. This outcome 
is listed in the center of each box of the matrix. Matrix 1 says, for example, 
that if Row were to choose r2 and Column were to choose c3, then out- 
come e would occur. Secondly, the entry in the lower left-hand corner of 
each box indicates the cost to Row of the corresponding pair of sequences 
of acts. Thirdly, the entry in the upper right-hand comer of each box 
indicates the cost to Column of that pair of courses of action. (5) To 
ascertain the cost of a pair of activities to a given agent, say Row, we 
proceed as follows. We begin by ignoring all utilities assigned by Row to 
the outcomes of E. We next consider the (expected) consequences apart 
from e and not-e themselves, of the various alternative sequences of acts 
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open to Row. These consequences might include the expenditure of  a 
certain amount  of  money and energy, or it might include the commitment  
of  a certain i tem of  patronage, or it might include the undergoing of  
certain penalties or sanctions. 2a We then select, among all the alternatives 
open to Row, the sequence(s) of  acts that would yield Row the highest 
utility. This sequence of acts has zero (opportunity) cost, and hence the 
numeral zero is inserted as the entry for Row in each box corresponding 
to that sequence of action, z4 To determine the cost entry for Row in all 
other boxes of  the matrix, we compare the utility that would accrue to 
him f rom each combination of courses of  action by Row and Column 
with the (zero) utility of  his best alternative. This difference in utility is the 
cost to Row of  that combination of activities, and it is inserted in his 
corner as a negative quantity. (6) Finally, it is assumed that each agent 
knows what the outcomes and costs would be (both to himself and to his 
opponent) of  all possible combinations of  sequences of  acts. 
To illustrate this procedure, consider Matrix 1. Looking first at the 
entries in the center of  the boxes, it is clear that Row has a sequence of  
acts available to him - viz., !"2 - that would ensure the occurrence of e, 
and he has a course of  action available to him - viz., ra - that would ensure 
not-e. I t  is clear, however, that both r2 and r 3 would be very costly for 
Row to perform. Setting aside the potential benefit of  outcome e or 
outcome not-e, the best sequence of acts open to Row - that is, the 
sequence that would yield the greatest utility (or the least disutility) - 
is r 1. In comparison with rl ,  sequences r z and r a are very unattractive. 
But r~ would neither ensure outcome e nor ensure outcome not-e. Hence 
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although there are sequences of acts available to Row that would ensure 
either of the two outcomes, these sequences of  acts are very costly, and 
it is not clear that Row would perform either of these sequences even if 
he wanted the outcome it could ensure. 
Assuming that Row is a 'rational' agent, what sequence of acts will he 
perform? That depends on whether he prefers e or prefers not-e, and it 
depends on how much, or how strongly, he prefers one to the other. It 
also depends, of course, on what Column is likely to do, which in turn 
depends on Column's preference as between e and not-e. Since we are 
interested primarily in comparisons of  power, let us suppose that Row 
and Column have opposing preferences. This supposition can be satisfied 
in two ways: (a) Row prefers e while Column prefers not-e, and (b) Row 
prefers not-e whereas Column prefers e. Next, some assumption must be 
made concerning the degrees of  preference. Let us assume, in each case 
that the degree of  preference for both agents is the same, viz. 100 utils. 
We have, then, two (hypothetical) cases on which to focus: (A) Row 
prefers e to not-e by 100 utils while Column prefers not-e to e 
by 100 utils, and (B) Row prefers not-e to e by 100 utils while 
Column prefers e to not-e by 100 utils. What would happen in each 
case? 
Only a little reflection is needed to see that, in each situation, Row and 
Column would perform sequences of acts that lead to Column's getting 
his preferred outcome. In each case Row's degree of  preference for a given 
outcome (whether e or not-e) would not suffice to motivate him to per- 
form either ra or r 3. The cost of ensuring either outcome would outweigh 
the benefit from that outcome. Hence, Row would opt for r 1, thereby 
leaving it up to Column's choice of action to determine whether e or 
not-e occurs. Now in case (A), where we imagine Column to prefer not-e, 
he would select sequence c 2. Admittedly, sequence c z is more costly, by 
10 utils, than sequence cl. But Column is assumed to prefer not-e to e 
by 100 utils, and so he would be better off, all things considered, to per- 
form c2. By selecting c2, given that Row selects r~, Column gets his 
preferred outcome (not-e). By similar reasoning (indeed, even more ob- 
viously), Column would get his preferred outcome in case (B); for in this 
case Row would perform rl and Column would perform cl, a combina- 
tion that would result in outcome e. Thus, in both hypothetical cases, 
Column would get his preferred outcome; and this is true despite the 
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fact that Row has 'winning' strategies available to him, and knows that 
he has these strategies, for both e and not-e. 
Let us step back now and take a new look at where our analysis leaves 
us. According to our initial conception, the idea of  power was understood 
in terms of functional dependencies between the desires of  an agent and 
the outcomes of  an issue. We have stressed, however, that the outcomes 
of  an issue are a function, not of desires simpliciter, but of  degrees of  
desire. I f  Row's preference for e over not-e were not of  the magnitude 
100, but rather of  the magnitude 2000, he would perform a different 
sequence of acts, and the outcome of the issue would be different. Now 
in the first three sections of the paper, we have talked about desiring e 
or not-e (or of  being neutral between them). But the introduction of  
degrees of  desire can help us add further refinements to our theory of  
power; specifically, it enables us to work toward an account of  degrees 
of  power. 25 
How are degrees of  power related to functional dependencies between 
degrees of  desire and outcomes of an issue ? The answer is straightforward: 
The extent o f  a person "s power w.r.t, an issue is (ceteris paribus) inversely 
related to the degree o f  desire required for him to obtain a preferred outcome. 
This answer is directly tied to considerations of  cost. I f  obtaining a 
preferred outcome is very costly for an agent, then it will require a higher 
degree of desire to motivate him to get that outcome. (Cf. the captured 
commander.) And the greater the cost of  getting an outcome, the less is 
a man's power w.r.t, that issue. 
There is a clear, intuitive idea here that we seek to capture. I f  a person 
is in a position vis-a-vis an issue such that even the slightest concern, the 
merest whim, would suffice for him to get his preferred outcome, then he 
has great power w.r.t, that issue. But if a man is in a position such that 
only very great concern would make it worth the trouble, effort, or expen- 
diture of  resources to obtain his preferred outcome, then he does not have 
so much power w.r.t, the issue. I f  a mere whim on the part of  a well- 
placed corporation executive would suffice to get an appropriate piece of  
legislation enacted, then he has great power w.r.t, that issue. I might be 
able to get a similar piece of  legislation enacted, but only if I wanted it 
badly enough to go to a great deal of trouble and effort. This implies 
that my power w.r.t, this kind of  issue is much smaller than the 
executive's. Similarly, if the executive and I are on opposing sides of  
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some issue, and if it is true that a moderate desire on his part for his most 
preferred outcome and a large desire on my part for my most preferred 
outcome would result in a victory for him, then his power exceeds mine. 
I f  we apply this idea in the case of Matrix 1, it is not at all clear that Row's 
power exceeds Column's. 
It is a consequence of  the current suggestion that sometimes a man who 
has less power w.r.t, an issue will get his preferred outcome over one who 
has more power on that issue. This can happen when the degree of  pref- 
erence of  the less powerful man far exceeds the degree of  preference of  the 
more powerful one. Suppose, for example, that Row prefers outcome e 
to not-e by 2000 utils, while Column prefers not-e to e by only 100 utils. 
(Actually, it doesn't matter here what the strength of  Column's preference 
is.) Then Row will choose r2 and will get his preferred outcome. This does 
not conclusively falsify the suggestion that Column has more power on 
the issue than Row. There is no reason to suppose that a more power- 
ful person on a given issue will always get his way over a less powerful one. 
On the contrary, it seems reasonable to define relative power in such a way 
that a powerful but relatively uncaring man may lose out to a less power- 
ful but  strongly motivated fellow. What a definition of  relative power 
must ensure is that a man who is powerful w.r.t, a given issue will get his 
way if the issue is one of considerable importance to him, at least if he is 
contending against someone whose concern for the issue is comparatively 
small. 
The foregoing discussion suggests that we may conceive of  a two- 
person power relationship as a function which maps pairs of degrees of 
desire (of  the two agents) onto outcomes of the issue in question. This 
may be illustrated with the aid of  simple graphs. Let X and Y be two 
agents and let e and not-e be two outcomes of an issue. X's preference 
w.r.t, these outcomes is measured along the X-axis of a coordinate system. 
A positive number along the X-axis represents a degree of preference by 
X for e over not--e, and a negative number represents a degree to which X 
prefers not-e over e. The zero-point signifies indifference between e and 
not-e. Similarly, Y's preference as between e and not-e is measured along 
the Y-axis. A point in the coordinate system will then represent a pair 
of  degrees of  preference (or desire) by X and Y. The point ( +  100, - 200), 
for example, represents a preference of  100 utils for e over not-e on the 
part of X and a preference of 200 utils for not-e over e on the part of  Y. 
Y 
X 
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Now suppose that the power position o fXand  Yis such that if Xwere to 
want e to degree 100 and Ywere to want not-e to degree 200 then e would 
occur. We shall represent this fact by darkening, or filling in, the point 
(+ 100, -200). (Of course we cannot literally darken points, but appro- 
priate areas can be darkened.) If, on the other hand, such a combination 
of desires by X and Y would result in not-e, then the point (+ 100, -200) 
will be marked by cross-hatching. (Again, it is only areas that can be so 
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marked.) Using these conventions, we can proceed to represent various 
possible relationships of power of X and Y w.r.t, issue E. Indeed, we can 
give information concerning both their collective power on the issue, and 
their relative power. 
Consider Graph 1 on page 255. Looking at the northeast and southwest 
quadrants, we see that Xand  Yhave the highest degree of collective power 
w.r.t, the issue (at least vis-a-vis this partition). For  i f X  and Y both prefer 
e to not-e then e will occur - no matter how small their degree of  prefer- 
ence, and if they both prefer not-e to e then not-e will occur - again no 
matter how small their degree of preference. Looking at the northwest and 
southeast quadrants, we see what would happen if X and Y had opposing 
preferences. The graph tells us that, in case of  opposing preference, the 
agent with the stronger preference gets his way. I f  Y's preference for e over 
not-e is greater than X's  preference for not-e over e, then e will occur; 
whereas not-e will occur if the converse holds. Similarly, if Y's preference 
for not-e over e exceeds S's  for e over not-e, then not-e will occur; and e 
will occur if the converse holds. Here we may conclude that X's power and 
Y's power w.r.t. E are equal. 
Since our primary interest is in comparisons of  power, let us restrict our 
attention to northwest and southeast quadrants. Graphs 2 and 3 depict 
power-relationships where it is natural to say that Yhas more power than 
X. Graph 2 says that Y gets his way no matter how small his preference 
and no matter how large X's opposing preference. In other words, Graph 
2 says that Y is able to ensure either e or not-e at no cost whatever. (This 
would be true if the courses of  action that would ensure e and not-e, 
respectively, had equal intrinsic attractiveness for Y and were each more 
attractive, apart from their effect on issue E, than any alternative course 
of  action.) Graph 3 again implies, I believe, that Y has more power than 
X, but here his excess of  power is not as great. According to this graph, 
there is a wide range of  cases in which Ywould get his preferred outcome 
with a smaller degree of  preference than X, but there are no cases in which 
X would get his preferred outcome with a smaller degree of  preference 
than Y. Other cases might also be mentioned in which one agent fairly 
clearly has more power than another. But I shall not pursue this further 
in this paper. There will be many cases, of  course, in which overall com- 
parisons of power are difficult to make. One such case is that of  Matrix 1, 
which is depicted in graphical form in Graph 4. Here the pattern of  power 
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is complicated, and it is not perfectly evident what conclusion should be 
drawn. No doubt the judgment we would intuitively make partly depends 
on the order of magnitude that the numbers in question convey. In any 
case, we should not expect our theory to yield precise judgments of power 
comparisons in all cases. Quite obviously, our pre-analytic judgments 
about power are not so precise to begin with, and we should heed Aristo- 
tle's advice not to expect (or impose) more precision than the subject- 
matter allows. What our theory does provide, however, is a framework 
for expressing in a systematic way the crucial factors that enter into an 
appraisal of the relative degree of power of two agents w.r.t, an issue. 
Before leaving the topic of power and cost, I wish to mention a diffi- 
culty confronting our theory that I do not know how to handle. Our use 
of the notion of opportunity cost has one disadvantage. By measuring 
cost, and hence power, in terms of the best alternative course of action 
open to the agent, one makes the degree of cost depend upon actions open 
to the agent that may have no connection at all with issue E. Suppose, for 
example, that you can obtain outcome e with an expenditure of $100. 
I come along and offer to sell you for $100 an extremely valuable painting 
that you would love to own. According to our theory, it would follow that 
I have reduced your power w.r.t, issue E. If we assume, at any rate, that 
you only have $100 to spend (or less than $ 200), buying the painting and 
spending $100 to get outcome e will be mutually exclusive courses of 
action. Hence, when I present you with this new opportunity, I thereby 
increase the cost to you of obtaining outcome e. This consequence of our 
theory is somewhat counterintuitive (though not entirely counterintuitive, 
I think), but I do not know how to deal with it without abandoning our 
theory completely. It seems clear, however, that the notion of cost must 
play a central role in any adequate theory of power. The approach we have 
sketched here seems very promising, and it should not lightly be aban- 
doned. 
V. O V E R A L L  P O W E R  A N D  P O W E R  " O V E R "  P E O P L E  
The foregoing analysis has focused on the power that an agent or group of 
agents have w.r.t, a single issue. But the concern of most discussions of 
power in the political arena is not the power of individuals or groups vis- 
~t-vis selected single issues, but rather the overall power of individuals or 
groups. We do not merely want to say that Melvin Laird or Nelson 
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Rockefeller has more power than I do w.r.t, this or that particular issue; 
we want to say that each of  these men has more power than I do on the 
whole. On what basis, however, are such judgments to be made? Is it that 
Rockefeller has power (or a higher degree of power) w.r.t, a larger number 
of  issues than I do? How are we supposed to count the number of  issues 
w.r.t, which each of us has power? Issues, it would seem, can be divided 
up in any way one chooses, and hence both Rockefeller and I could be 
said to have power w.r.t, indefinitely many issues. A better answer to our 
question would appeal not to the number of issues over which we have 
power, but to their importance. I may have power w.r.t, what I eat for 
dinner tonight, what grades my students get, what sentences are written 
on my blackboard, etc. But Rockefeller has power w.r.t. 'really important '  
issues. But how is the ' importance' of  an issue to be measured? One ele- 
ment that should go into the determination of ' importance' (for present 
purposes) is the number of  people that would be affected by the issue. The 
fact that I have more power than Rockefeller does w.r.t, what will be writ- 
ten on my blackboard doesn't count for much in assessing my overall 
power as compared with Rockefeller's. On the other hand, the fact that 
Rockefeller has more power than I do w.r.t, the issues of  taxation and 
expenditure of the State of  New York is a very important reason for say- 
ing that he has more overall power. One thing that helps account for this 
is that taxation and expenditure policies of the State of New York affect 
a very large number of people. 
But what do we mean when we say that an issue 'affects' a person? And 
can one issue 'affect' a man more or less than another issue? The answer to 
the first question, I think, is suggested by looking at the second. I am in- 
clined to say that one issue affects a person more than another issue if the 
outcomes of  the first issue would make a larger difference to his welfare than 
the outcomes of  the second. An issue whose outcomes would make no 
difference whatever to his welfare does not affect him at all. In determining 
a man's overall power, therefore, we must look not only at the number of  
persons that would be affected by the issues w.r.t, which he has power, 
but also at how much difference in welfare the outcomes of  the issue would 
cause. This principle accords nicely with our intuitions about the 'impor- 
tant '  issues of  the day. The issue of  war or peace, the issue of inflation and 
unemployment, the issue of pollution and measures for combating it, the 
issue of  poverty and racism, are some of the major issues of  contemporary 
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American life. They all have in common the two features we have men- 
tioned: first, they all affect the welfare of  a large number of  people, and 
secondly, the outcomes of these issues make a very large difference in the 
welfare of  these people. It is not surprising, therefore, t ha t  individuals or 
groups who have power w.r.t, these issues, and especially w.r.t, a large 
number of  these issues, are regarded as having a great deal of  overall 
power. 
In determining a man's overall power, we shall not simply be interested 
in the single issues w.r.t, which he has power; we shall also be extremely 
interested in the question of  his power w.r.t, conjunctions of  issues. Sup- 
pose there are two independent issues, E and E*, each partitioned into 
three outcomes. Issue E has outcomes el, e2 and e 3, and issue E* has out- 
comes e*, e~ and e3. Further suppose that Smith is in a position 
to ensure any of  the outcomes of E through a payment of  $100 and is 
in a position to ensure any of  the outcomes of  E* through a payment of  
$100. Then if Smith has exactly $100, he has (individual) power w.r.t. 
each of  these issues. Now suppose, however, that we consider the con- 
junctive issue E & E*. This issue has nine possible outcomes: e 1 & e* 1, 
* It does not follow from our original sup- e 1 & e*,.. . ,  e 3 & e*, ea & ca. 
position that Smith has (individual) power w.r.t, this conjunctive issue. 
For  if he only has $100, he will not be in a position to ensure any of the 
nine indicated outcomes. I f  we suppose that Smith has $ 200, however, 
it will follow that he not only has power w.r.t, each of  the outcomes, E 
and E*, but that he also has power w.r.t, the conjunctive issue, E & E*. 
Obviously, in determining the economic and political power of  men and 
groups, attention to conjunctions of  issues is of crucial importance. I f  a 
man has power w.r.t, a conjunction of  many issues, each of which signif- 
icantly affects the welfare of  many people, then he is a very powerful man. 
In the foregoing paragraphs the notion of welfare has been taken for 
granted, and we shall continue to do this in the remainder of the paper. 
For  illustrative purposes, let us associate a man's welfare with the satis- 
faction or non-satisfaction of his desires. (It is not clear that welfare should 
be identified with satisfaction of  desires - rather than, say, with the satis- 
faction of  needs or interests - but this is close enough for the moment.) 
Suppose that the degree of desire (or utility) assigned by Jones to the 
possible outcomes of  E are as follows: (el) + 100, (e2) + 70, (ca) + 20, 
( e , ) - 4 0 ,  and (es) -100.  Further suppose that Jones has no power at all 
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w.r.t, issue E, but that Smith has enough power to ensure any one of the 
outcomes e2, ej, and e4 (though not el or es). We can then say that Smith 
has the power to make a fairly substantial difference in Jones' welfare - 
in particular, a difference of 110utils (the difference between the utility of the 
best outcome for Jones that Smith can ensure and the utility of the worst 
outcome that Smith can ensure). Now if Smith had the power to ensure a n y  
of the five outcomes of  E, and not just the middle three, then Smith's 
power over Jones would be even greater. Of course, our assessment of  
Smith's power over Jones is partly a function of  the degree  of  power 
Smith has w.r.t, these outcomes. I f  it would be quite cosily for Smith to 
secure any of these outcomes, then his power over Jones is less than it 
would be if the cost to Smith were small. Thus, in determining an agent's 
overall power, there are several factors to be considered: (1) the issues 
w.r.t, which the agent has s o m e  power, (2) the conjunctions of these issues 
w.r.t, which he has power, (3) the degree of power (in terms of cost) he 
has w.r.t, these issues, (4) the number of  people affected by these issues, 
and (5) the amounts of  the differences in these people's welfare that de- 
pend on the outcomes of  these issues. 
During most of  our discussion we have concentrated on the notion of  
having power 'with respect to'  an 'issue'. The term 'power', however, 
frequently occurs in sentences of the fo rm 'Xhas  power over Y', where ' Y' 
designates a person or group of people. We still owe an account, there- 
fore, of  having power over  a per son .  Our remarks in the previous para- 
graph suggest such an account. Smith has power over  Jones ,  we might say, 
if and only if Smith has power w.r.t, issues that affect Jones - i.e., that 
make a difference to Jones' welfare. 
In addition to the support already given to this approach, the welfare 
accounts fits neatly with the relation between power and dependence that 
is often cited by sociologists. ~6 If agent X controls certain objects or 
events which Y desires, or on which he sets a value, then Yis 'dependent' 
on X for the satisfaction of  his desires or interests. Intuitively, this looks 
like a case in which X has power 'over' I7. This intuition is captured by 
the welfare approach we have sketched; for if Yis dependent on X fo r  the 
satisfaction of his desires or interests, then X has power w.r.t, issues that 
affect the welfare of Y. 
The suggested account of having power over  people is in accord with a 
number of treatments of power in the literature. But many other writers 
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take a somewhat different approach. Writers such as R. H. Tawney, 
Robert  Dahl, J. C. Harsanyi, and Herbert Simon conceive of power over 
people as the ability to affect the behavior of  those people. ~7 Tawney, for 
example, defines 'power' as "the capacity of  an individual, or group of 
individuals, to modify the conduct of  other individuals or groups in the 
manner which he desires.. ." (op. cit., p. 230). Similarly, Robert  Dahl 
says: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something 
that B would not otherwise do"  (op. cir., pp. 202-3). 
Now as a complementary approach to the welfare account, the behavior 
approach is certainly welcome. But if it is intended to replace the welfare 
approach, I think it is unsatisfactory. Considered as a replacement, the 
behavior approach has three problems. First, it is difficult to see how it 
can throw much light on the determination of  the degrees of  power that 
person X has over person t7. The main possibility here would be to con- 
centrate on the number of  acts of  Y w.r.t, which X has power. 2s But 
principles for counting acts or items of behavior are very controversial. 
On the theory I favor, most cases of  changing the behavior of an indiv- 
idual would involve changes in indefinitely many acts. Moreover, on any 
approach to act-individuation one should be able to make temporal 
divisions any way one pleases, so it will be impossible to decide when one, 
two or three acts have been affected. The welfare approach, by contrast, 
holds greater promise for the measurement of degrees of power. 
A second problem for the behavior approach is that behavior control 
is not clearly a sufficient condition for the exercise of power. Suppose that 
you are about to sit in a chair. I politely ask you to sit in the next chair 
instead, and since it is equally comfortable, you oblige. Here I have 
affected your behavior: I have induced you to do something you would 
not otherwise have done. But have I exercised power over you? This is 
doubtful. The reason it is doubtful, I think, can be explained by the wel- 
fare approach. First of  all, there is no difference for your welfare between 
sitting in the one chair or sitting in the other. Secondly, since my method 
of  inducing the change in behavior did not depend on threats or depriva- 
tion of opportunities, there is nothing in the case to suggest that I have 
any means of  (importantly) affecting your welfare. A similar case is that 
of  a sky-writer, whose tracks cause many people to perform acts they 
would not otherwise perform, viz., look up at the sky. There is little 
temptation to say that the sky-writer l~as exercised power over these 
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people. Although he causes a change in behavior, this change is unac- 
companied by any (or very much) change in welfare. 
A third problem for the behavior approach is the existence of cases 
where behavior control fails but where there is inclination to talk of the 
exercise of power. Suppose I threaten to beat you up unless you do act A. 
You refuse to comply and so I beat you up. Here I have failed to control 
your behavior, but isn't my beating you up itself an exercise of power? 29 
I am inclined to think that it is. My having power w.r.t, your getting 
beaten up is a form of power over you, even when unaccompanied by 
power w.r.t, your doing A. Again, this case is easily accounted for by the 
welfare approach, since my having power w.r.t, the issue of your getting 
beaten up is deafly having power w.r.t, an issue that importantly affects 
your welfare. 
It goes without saying, of course, that power w.r.t, behavior and power 
w.r.t, welfare are in general closely interdependent. (This point is stressed 
by many authors, including Harsanyi and Thibaut and Kelley to mention 
just a few.) If X has power w.r.t, issues that affect Y's welfare, and if he 
knows how they would affect Y's welfare, then he is in a position to make 
threats or offers to Y in order to affect his behavior, z0 Moreover, certain 
ways of affecting behavior characteristically result in behavior that is 
less valuable to the agent affected. If X deters Yby threat from performing 
an act, or if X prevents Y from performing an act he otherwise would have 
performed, then there is typically a loss in utility for Y. Even though Y 
averts the threatened sanction or penalty by complying with X's desires, 
the substitute course of action is normally less valuable for Y than the 
act he would have performed had X not intervened. For these reasons, 
then, there is a close connection between power w.r.t, the behavior of Y 
and power w.r.t, issues affecting the welfare of Y. 
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that there are cases of power 'over' 
people that involve only power w.r.t, their behavior, not power w.r.t. 
their welfare. The most obvious cases of this sort are cases of what 
Max Weber calls 'imperative control' or 'imperative coordination' (Herr- 
schaft). When the commands of an authority in a corporate group are 
accepted by the group as 'legitimate', there is a tendency to obey the 
commands without the need for coercion (or reward). In many such cases, 
moreover, compliance with these commands have no effect (or very little 
effect) on the welfare of the compilers. For very often the behavior called 
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for by these imperatives is more-or-less routine behavior of functionaries 
which is quite inconsequential as far as they themselves are concerned. 
Needless to say, the possession of  imperative control is normally an 
extremely valuable resource to have in controlling the we/fare of people. 
That is, it normally enables its possessor to have significant degrees of 
power w.r.t, issues that affect people's welfare. The point, however, is that 
we can abstract from this power w.r.t, welfare and still be left with some- 
thing important that would ordinarily be called power 'over" people. 
Thus, it is important to retain the notion of behavior control as a distinct 
category of  power 'over' people, despite its large overlap with the category 
of  welfare control. 
A third category of power 'over' people is also called for, though again 
the overlap with the other categories will be substantial. The third category 
is power to persuade, or more generally, power w.r.t, various psychological 
states of  others, especially desires, beliefs, and attitudes. To the extent 
that a 'charismatic' leader has power w.r.t, the attitudes of  his followers, 
and to the extent that the controller of  communication media has power 
w.r.t, the desires and beliefs of the public, such men have power 'over' 
others. To be sure, power of  this sort is closely connected with power w.r.t. 
behavior and power w.r.t, welfare. The difference between true and false 
belief, for example, will frequently make a difference to one's ability or 
inability to satisfy one's interests. Nevertheless, there are many cases in 
which the connection between desires and beliefs, on the one hand, and 
behavior and welfare, on the other, is at best very indirect and complicated. 
Many beliefs are never acted upon, and changes in desire are hard to relate 
to changes in welfare. For  these reasons, then, it is worth including the 
third category as a distinct category of  power 'over' others. 
A further reason for emphasizing the third category must also be men- 
tioned. Our analysis of power w.r.t, an issue, it should be recalled, makes 
an essential appeal both to hypothetical desires of an agent and to his 
actual desires (which determine the cost of an activity). It is obvious, 
therefore, that X's having power w.r.t. Y's desires can have an important 
bearing on Y's power w.r.t, an issue. In fact, this point raises an important 
question about our analysis of power w.r.t, issues. According to our 
analysis, we are interested in whether an outcome of  an issue would occur 
/ f  agent Y wanted that outcome. But suppose agent X is in a position to 
ensure that Y will not want this outcome. What does this imply about  
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Y's  p o w e r  w.r . t ,  t h a t  i s sue?  Th i s  q u e s t i o n  m u s t  be  t a k e n  u p  in  a m o r e  
fu l ly  d e v e l o p e d  t h e o r y  o f  p o w e r ,  b u t  this  is n o t  t he  o c c a s i o n  fo r  such  a 
d e v e l o p m e n t .  81 
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power concept for empirical research, see J. G. March, 'The Power of Power', in 
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(1966). 
2 See Robert Dalai, 'The Concept of Power', Behavioral Science 2 (1957), pp. 212-3. 
Actually, Dahl's chameleon just decides to vote with the predicted outcome, but I 
assume that his desires change to favor it as well. 
3 For  further details on the notion of a basic act-type, see my book A Theory of Human 
Action, Prentiee-Hall (1970), Chapter III, Section 4 (and also Chapter VII, Section 1). 
In this paper I am ignoring certain complications, such as the existence of 'standard 
conditions'. I shall also assume, for the most part, that all persons have the same basic 
act repertoire, though in one of my examples (in Section III) I shall drop this assump- 
tion. 
a In ordinary language we frequently use the term 'power' without having a particular 
dated issue in mind. If John has a rain-making machine, for example, we might say that 
he has power over 'the weather', without specifying the time in question. This loose talk 
about power can be understood in terms of  power w.r.t, dated issues. To say that John 
has power w.r.t, the weather (in general), is to say that there are dated issues involving 
the weather w.r.t, which John has power. Having a rain-making machine gives John 
power over the weather 'in general' because there are particular times at which it 
would not rain in the normal course of events, and w.r.t, rain at these times John has 
power. To say that John has power over the weather, in this sense, does not imply that 
John has power w.r.t, every dated issue involving the weather. If  it is going to rain at 
time t no matter what John does (and if, in addition, he cannot control how hard it 
rains), then John has no power w.r.t, the issue of whether or not it rains at t. Assuming 
that he has no rain-prevention equipment, at any rate, he is impotent w.r.t, the issue of 
whether or not it rains at t. 
5 Actually, (I') needs still further refinement. First, it is not enough to require that S 
would perform the relevant acts; he must perform these acts in order to achieve the 
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given outcome (or at least in the belief that his performance of them would not  prevent 
the occurrence of that outcome). Secondly, the analysis still remains open to counter- 
examples of the sort that beset (I). Suppose that S is not paralyzed and he falsely 
believes that  whenever he snaps his fingers this causes rain clouds to disperse. It  is true 
of S, then, that  if he wanted non-rain he would snap his fingers (moreover, he would 
snap them in order to obtain non-rain). Further suppose, as in the earlier example, 
that  S* has the ability to detect S 's  desires by ESP, and he has resolved to make the 
weather conform with S 's  desire. Now although S's  snapping his fingers would not be 
causally relevant to the occurrence of non-rain, there is a sequence of basic acts such 
that  if S wanted non-rain he would perform these acts, and if he performed these acts 
non-rain would occur. Thus, S satisfies (I') w.r.t, the issue of rain or non-rain. But it is 
doubtful that  we would credit S with power w.r.t, this issue. 
What  goes wrong here is that  S is mistaken about the contribution that his finger- 
snapping would make to the occurrence of non-rain. He erroneously believes that  this 
act would directly cause the dispersal of the clouds, and he is completely ignorant of the 
role of S*. To circumvent such problems we need a provision requiring that  the agent's 
conception of the relevance of his action to the outcome must correspond to the rele- 
vance his action would indeed have. I do not know how to formulate such a provision 
in adequate detail (similar problems are encountered in the analysis of intentional 
action and in the analysis of knowing), but I shall suggest a vague formulation for the 
present. 
Each of the conjuncts of (I') should be amended as follows: 
"There is a sequence of basic act-types such that  
(a) if S wanted e [not-el, then, at  appropriate times between tt  and t,~, he 
would perform these acts, either (i) in order to achieve outcome e [not-el, 
or (ii) in the belief that they would not  preclude the occurrence of e 
[not-el, and 
(b) if S performed these acts at these appropriate times, then they would 
contribute to the occurrence o f e  [not-el in the way S would expect them 
to contribute, and e [not-el would occur (at t~)." 
(Notice that my reformulation of clause (b) does not imply that  S's action would cause 
the outcome. This is because I want to allow, for one of the outcomes, that  it would 
occur in the 'normal '  course of events. This is all right as long as S realizes, for the 
appropriate outcome, that  his action would merely 'allow' this outcome to occur, 
rather than cause it to occur.) 
The indicated reformulation should be regarded as my 'official' analysis of individual 
power. I omit it from the text because I want to use (I') as a model for later analyses; to 
use the more refined analysis, I fear, would obscure the more important structural 
features of the theory. 
6 Cf. W. V. Quine, Word and Object, The Technology Press, Cambridge, Mass. (1960), 
pp. 222-6. 
7 Perhaps we should draw a distinction here between an 'epistemic' sense of 'power'  
and a 'non-epistemic' sense of 'power'. The epistemic sence is captured by (I') as it 
stands, whereas the non-epistemic sense can be obtained from (I') by deleting clauses 
(1) (a) and (2) (a). This distinction would parallel the distinction between the epistemic 
and non-epistemic senses of 'ability' that  I draw in A Theory o f  Human Action, p. 203. 
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